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Introduction: Haryana was the first state in India to launch a conditional cash transfer (CCT) scheme in 1994.
Initially it targeted all disadvantaged girls but was revised in 2005 to restrict it to second girl children of all groups.
The benefit which accrued at girl attaining 18 years and subject to conditionalities of being fully immunized,
studying till class 10 and remaining unmarried, was increased from about US$ 500 to US$ 2000. Using a mixed
methods approach, we evaluated the implementation and possible impact of these two schemes.
Methods: A survey was conducted among 200 randomly selected respondents of Ballabgarh Block in Haryana to
assess their perceptions of girl children and related schemes. A cohort of births during this period was assembled
from population database of 28 villages in this block and changes in sex ratio at birth and in immunization
coverage at one year of age among boys and girls was measured. Education levels and mean age at marriage of
daughters were compared with daughters-in-law from outside Haryana. In-depth interviews were conducted
among district level implementers of these schemes to assess their perceptions of programs’ implementation and
impact. These were analyzed using a thematic approach.
Results: The perceptions of girls as a liability and poor (9% to 15%) awareness of the schemes was noted. The
cohort analysis showed that while there has been an improvement in the indicators studied, these were similar to
those seen among the control groups. Qualitative analysis identified a “conspiracy of silence” - an underplaying of
the pervasiveness of the problem coupled with a passive implementation of the program and a clash between
political culture of giving subsidies and a bureaucratic approach that imposed many conditionalities and documentary
needs for availing of benefits.
Conclusion: The apparent lack of impact on the societal mindset calls for a revision in the current approach of
addressing a social issue by a purely conditional cash transfer program.Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are ambi-
tious targets aimed at ensuring universal primary educa-
tion, reducing poverty, combating infectious diseases,
and promoting gender equality in the world [1].
Already, the MDGs have catalyzed action at national
and international level to unprecedented levels and fos-
tered use of innovative approaches which have helped* Correspondence: kanandiyer@yahoo.com
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stated.to lift millions of people out of poverty, save lives and
ensure that children attend school, expanded opportun-
ities for women, increased access to clean water and
freed many people from diseases [2]. One such new ap-
proach is that of use of conditional cash transfer pro-
grams (CCTs) [3-5].
CCTs adopt a targeting mechanism; provide cash
benefit upon compliance with a set of conditionalities to
promote investments in human capital dimensions and,
in some cases, also in social capital- such as sending
children to school or bringing them to health centers.
The success of the first generation of programs in Latinl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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ventive health care, and raising household consumption
has been documented [6,7]. However, the potential of
CCT programs to function well under different condi-
tions and to address a broader range of challenges is not
yet clear. For example, such schemes have not been used
extensively for addressing the lower status of girls or
women in the society. In other words, can CCT pro-
grams influence a family to invest more in girls in com-
munities where differences between girls and boys are
socially entrenched as in South Asia? The experience in
Bangladesh indicates that this works for improving girls’
education but it is not clear whether this resulted in a
higher status of girls in the society [8].
Differences in the care of sons and daughters in South
Asia stem from parents’ perception of sons as assets and
daughters as liabilities [9]. This arises due to perceived
differences in the net returns from raising boys and girls.
Expected returns of investing in sons are considered
higher as males earn higher wages in the labor market
and female labor force participation is low. Districts with
higher female labor force participation displayed less
bias against girls in India [10]. The returns from girls are
further compromised because of the practices of dowry
and exogamous marriage that effectively reduce girls’
expected contributions to their natal homes while
placing sons in the role of providers in old age. Finally,
preference for boys is not only for economic reasons but
also because of customary and religious practices which
put boys on a higher pedestal than girls.
Haryana is one of India’s richest states as measured by
per capita GDP, but it ranks among the worst in terms
of female disadvantage. In 2011, the lowest sex ratios for
those aged 0–6 years were observed in north India, par-
ticularly in Haryana (830 girls per 1000 boys) [11]. Stud-
ies have also documented a strong pattern of female
disadvantage in child survival, health and schooling. We
have earlier shown a continuous survival disadvantage
for girls from birth to five years of age and shown that
this was more common among socio-economically
advantaged groups [12,13]. Using a collection of data as-
sembled from the Demographic Health Surveys from a
large number of countries including the individual states
of India, Filmer et al. report that the level of gender dis-
parities in health and education outcomes for girls at the
national level in South Asia is the largest in the world,
the ratio of female to male child mortality in Haryana is
worse than any country in the world, and that there is
almost no correlation between per-capita income and
the gender disparities in health and education outcomes.
So, while the absolute level of health and education
outcomes for girls are strongly related to economic
conditions, the disparities between females and males
are not [14].In order to address such big gender gaps, several states
in India introduced financial incentive programs in
1990s to discourage son preference among parents and
encourage investment in daughters’ education and
health. Haryana was the first state in India to launch
such a scheme in 1994, which was later replicated in
many states. A recent review actually listed fifteen such
schemes implemented by the Government of India as
well as by state Governments [15]. However, the impact
of schemes addressing girl children in India have not
been adequately evaluated, primarily owing to their long
term nature and short time since their introduction.
Most evaluations have focused on process evaluation
and included beneficiary and program managers’ feed-
back [15,16]. The National Advisory Council of Govern-
ment of India has recommended that such CCT
schemes should be fully evaluated [17].
This paper tries to evaluate girl child related schemes
being implemented in Haryana State by focusing on one
district (Faridabad) using multiple sources of qualitative
and quantitative data. The domains of evaluation (data
sources) included assessment of community perceptions,
program implementers’ perspectives and impact of the
program. The Institutional Ethical Committee of the All
India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi,
cleared the study.
Our quantitative hypotheses were:
1. There is poor awareness and community
mobilization on schemes related to girl child in this
community.
2. There has been no significant impact of these
schemes in terms of a change in sex ratio at birth or
higher investment in girl children in the form of
higher immunization coverage, education levels and
age at marriage as compared to communities where
such schemes have not been implemented.
3. To understand the perceptions of the beneficiaries
and implementers on the existing girl child schemes
and their implementation.
Description of the schemes
There were two main schemes launched in Haryana as
described in Table 1. The first one started in 1994, ap-
propriately labeled as “Apni Beti Apna Dhan” (our
daughter, our wealth) to address girls being treated as
“paraya dhan” (someone else’s wealth), was aimed at so-
cially disadvantaged populations, with government
bonds worth US$ 50 (Indira Vikas Patra) being pur-
chased at the time of birth and the subsequent five years
so that beneficiaries would mature with interest to about
US$ 500 when the girl became 18 years old. A bonus
of US$ 100 is awarded is if the girl has received at
least a Standard 5 education, and a further US$ 20
Table 1 Summary of conditional cash transfer schemes for girl children in Haryana State
Scheme Apni Beti Apna Dhan (Our daughter, our wealth) LAADLI (Favourite girl)
Source of funds & year of launch Government of Haryana Government of Haryana
October 1994 August 2005
Beneficiary/conditions Listed Disadvantaged groups (Scheduled and backward
castes and Below Poverty line)
Resident of Haryana on the birth of a second girl child
conditional to completion of immunization and schooling.
Benefits/Penalties US$ 10 to the mother within 15 days of birth. US$ 100 per family per year upto 5 years invested in
Government Bonds. Given at the age of the second girl
attaining the age of 18 (matures to around US$ 2000).Bonds of US$ 50 in the name of Child within
3 months to mature to US$ 500 by year 18.
In 1995, scheme expanded to offer a higher maturity
amount for girls willing to defer redeeming their
securities: Rs. US$ 600 for 2 yrs, or US$ 700 for 4 yrs.
Actual beneficiaries/Achievements 2003-04 – 52,501 mothers enrolled in the state Haryana – 49,558 in 2007–08 with US$ 5 million
expenditure and in Faridabad Dist.- 2239
Cumulatively up to March 2010–1,03,613 families have
benefited and US$ 24 million spent
Comments/Remarks http://faridabad.nic.in/Administration/women&.htm http://wcdhry.gov.in/new_schemes_F.htm
Not for the first girl child
Prevents early marriage as well. Prevents early marriage as well. Has been extended for
next five years.
http://www.wcdhry.gov.in/admn_2003-2004.pdf
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Haryana government expanded the scheme by offering a
higher maturity amount for girls willing to defer re-
deeming their securities: US$ 600 for two years, or US$
700 for 4 years. In addition, they would also receive a
credit subsidy for entrepreneurship loans.
This scheme was replaced by “Laadli” scheme in 2005
which restricted the benefit to the second girl child, re-
moved restrictions about being disadvantaged and in-
creased the incentive at maturity to about US$ 2,000.
Applicants need to submit four documents (domicile
certificate, caste certificate (even though it is not a cri-
terion), birth certificate of both girl children and ration
card). Also, to be eligible for claim, beneficiaries have to
fulfill conditionalities like completing immunization and
schooling (with documentation) and remaining unmar-
ried at 18 years. Both the schemes were implemented
through Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)
Scheme whose anganwadi workers were entrusted with
the responsibility of identifying the beneficiaries and fa-
cilitating paper work. As per the data available in their
websites, ABAD scheme registered 52,503 beneficiaries
in whole of Haryana in one year 2003–04. Laadli scheme
also registered about similar numbers in 2007–08 and in
2010 registered 103,613 families.Methodology
The study area was Ballabgarh Block of district Faridabad,
where AIIMS runs its two primary health centres (PHCs)
and has been the subject of our earlier studies on girl childdiscrimination [12,13,18]. We used a mixed methods
approach.
Quantitative component
This included collection of primary data through inter-
views and analysis of secondary datasets. Community
perspective was assessed through a survey in eight randomly
selected villages of Ballabgarh block. Assuming an awareness
level of 50% (maximizes sample size) with an error of 10%
and a design effect of 2, we arrived at a sample size of 200.
One hundred males and 100 females were interviewed from
among the houses which had children aged less than or
equal to 18 years. In each village, the first respondent
was selected randomly from the centre of the village and
25 consecutive houses were selected moving outwards
with males and females being studied in alternate
houses. The study tool included questions on the
background characteristics of the interviewee, commu-
nity perceptions on girl child discrimination, its reasons,
awareness and utilization of government schemes on
girl children. It was pilot tested in non-study villages
and then modified accordingly. Data collection was
done during February-March 2012.
For impact evaluation, a computerized database of 28
villages falling under these two PHCs was used. The
electronic database has been described previously and
stores population data since 1992 [19]. In brief, demo-
graphic data on the whole population is stored and up-
dated annually including births, deaths, marriages and
migrations. Relevant variables like immunization and
education are also included. The database does not have
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set from 1992 to 2010 was divided into four time periods
dependent upon the introduction of the Schemes. 1992–
1994 served as the baseline as no programs had been yet
introduced. 1994–2004 was the period when ABAD
Scheme was launched (including its modification in
1999). 2005–2010 served as the period when Laadli
scheme was launched. For studying the impact of these
schemes on sex ratio at birth and immunization cover-
age, we used birth cohorts of these four time periods.
Boys of the same cohort served as the controls for
immunization coverage. The hypothesis was that the
improvement in immunization coverage of girl children
over time would be steeper as compared to boys.
To evaluate improved investment in education of girls
and for postponement of marriages, we used cohorts of
elder girls who married out at these time periods in
these families. As the objective of the scheme is to
change the mindset of the society, this should be seen
even currently and not wait for actual beneficiaries to
mature until the age of marriage. As there are large boy-
girl differences especially in the age of marriage, boys
would not serve as good controls. Instead, we used
daughters-in-law who come from outside Haryana
(where there are no such schemes) as controls and com-
pared their age at marriage and education levels to the
daughters of the house at the time of marriage.
Data were analyzed using SPSS version 17.0. We used
ANOVA to estimate the significance of changes in mean
ages observed during these time periods and chi-square
for trend for all proportions.
Qualitative component
In-depth interviews were conducted among two benefi-
ciaries of ABAD and Laadli schemes and all of the two
Block (one urban and one rural) and three village level
implementers of the government schemes. The selection
of village level respondents was convenience based. The
interviews were conducted after taking consent from the
officials and were audio taped. The interview guide had
open-ended questions on presence of girl child discrim-
ination in the community, effectiveness of the schemes,
barriers for their implementation and suggestions for
improvement. The interviews were conducted in Hindi,
transcribed and translated into English by one of the
authors (RA).
Data from in-depth interviews were analyzed using
thematic analysis approach that allowed researchers to
group codes and categories that are similar into themes
that reflect specific patterns in the data. All answers
were initially read repeatedly to get a sense of the whole
and diverseness of the response. Subsequently the free
text was coded into meaningful units grounded in the
text. These were subsequently categorized manuallythrough an interactive process between the researchers
(RA, AK). The categories were then linked into themes




The perceptions of the community regarding status of
girl child are described in Table 2. It is evident that girl
child discrimination and fetal sex determination were
the societal norm and this was largely because girl chil-
dren were considered an economic liability and someone
else’s (husbands’ family) asset. This along with the prac-
tice of dowry was identified as the main reason why par-
ents were not ready to invest in their girl children. The
girl children were less likely to be breast fed, given full
diet and be educated. Because the underlying rationale
for discrimination was economic, it was also believed by
the community members that this problem was more
common among poor and uneducated. Even though the
participants felt that not enough was being done by the
government, they felt that the situation was generally
improving for girls. The awareness of ABAD and Laadli
among the community members varied between 9% to
15%.
The data on sex ratio at birth (Table 3) shows that the
sex ratio at birth worsened consistently (but not signifi-
cantly) from 866 to 826 girls per 1,000 boys during the
study period. However, there was some improvement for
the first-born children but the situation in the subse-
quent born became worse. Immunization coverage at 12
months of age increased significantly for both boys and
girls from around 60% in early nineties to above 95% in
the latter time period (2005–2010) indicating a general
improvement in immunization coverage. Daughters-in
law (DILs) from outside Haryana in these villages were
more likely to be educated beyond tenth grade and have
higher age at marriage as compared to daughters
(Table 3). Both educational levels and mean age at mar-
riage showed a significant increase among both daugh-
ters and DILs. When DILs from within Haryana were
analyzed separately, similar results were found.
Qualitative component
The program implementers had a general assessment
that these programs were successful in reducing the girl
child discrimination. Increase in registration of birth of
girls was reported so that the parents can avail the
benefits.
“Of course, earlier people would not come forward,
they would not even tell that a girl child had been
born in their house, they would not even celebrate the
birth. Because of the scheme they at least come
Table 2 Community perceptions about girl child and government schemes on it (n = 200)
Respondents who Proportion (%)
Believed that society differentiates in bringing up of boys and girls 47
Believed that the girl child is discriminated because she is considered a “paraya dhan” (Others’ asset) 41
Said that pregnant women is pressurized by her spouse/in laws to go for sex determination 77
Estimated that more than 50% of the families in their villages go for sex determination tests 36
Said that government has not done enough to address the problem 68
Suggested following measures that government can take to address this issue
• Financial help to the families with girl children 79
• Penalties to those going for sex determination 25
Said that there was an improvement in the attitude towards girl child in last few years 72.5
Were aware of
• Existence of any girl child related schemes 56%
• Apni Beti Apna Dhan (ABAD) 15%
• Laadli 9%
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benefit of registering for this scheme, some register on
their own otherwise too. There are changes, but mostly
they come forward (to register) to get these benefits” –
Block level implementer
“Yes the scheme is good. The main benefit is if there
are no girls then how would boys get girls (for
marriage)? Earlier people used to practice feticide, but
this has now come down – no case in my area till
now.”– Community Level Implementer
A closer scrutiny of the data revealed two basic themes
(Table 4). The first one we labelled as a “Conspiracy ofTable 3 Assessment of impact of conditional cash transfer ba
Time periods 1992-1994
Indicator Reference group Baseline





Girls born in this
period
59.8
Boys born in this
period
62.0
Proportion educated≥ 10th grade
among those married in the years




Mean age ± S.D. at marriage among
those married in the years
Daughters (n) 18.3 ± 2.7 (137
Non-Haryana
DILs* (n)
19.1 ± 2.7 (476
*DIL – daughter in-law.Silence”. There was a general tendency to underesti-
mate the pervasiveness of the problem in the commu-
nity in the indepth interviews, unlike what was seen
in the community survey. This occurred either in
the form of complete denial or more likely by restrict-
ing the problem to a specific sub group – rural, poor,
slums, uneducated etc. It was not seen as a problem
of the whole community by anybody. This could
also take the form of overrating the effectiveness of
the program.
“It is not that discrimination is too much, it is that
there are some families which are reluctant to change
their practices”– Block level implementersed interventions on status of girl children (1992–2010)
1995-1998 1999-2004 2005-2010 P value
for trendApni Beti Apna
Dhan
Revised ABAD Laadli scheme
862 (8480) 845 (12488) 826 (12091) NS
912 893 904 NS
846 825′ 780 NS
70.1 88.8 95.8 .00
71.5 89.9 97.0 .00
4.4 (2298) 8.6 (2475) 27.9 (2578) .000
18.5 (750) 25.1 (1354) 41.2 (1669) .000
0) 18.1 ± 2.9 (2298) 18.7 ± 2.9 (2475) 19.7 ± 2.8 (2578) .0000
) 19.1 + 2.9 (750) 19.4 ± 2.8 (1354) 19.7 ± 2.7 (1669) .0000
Table 4 Themes categories and subcategories of program implementers’ experiences of implementing conditional cash
transfer schemes for girl children in Ballabgarh
Themes identified Categories Subcategories
“Conspiracy of silence” Undervalue the
seriousness of problem
Restrict the problem to specific groups (Only those with many girls
discriminate; This is not seen in urban areas; seen only in slums due to
lack of awareness)
Complete denial of its presence (Have not seen this problem in my area)
Overrate the effectiveness
of the program
The problem is decreasing




Lack of awareness about the programs
Anganwadi workers filling the forms house to house
Clash between the political culture of subsidy
and bureaucratic approach of accountability
A culture of subsidies Nobody says no to free money
Mainly come forward to claim money, no real change
Why not give it to first child also
“Politician giveth away but Bureaucracy
taketh away”






Delay in release of certificates
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being implemented in an underhand and passive sort of
way. There was no community participation. Local pan-
chayats or health functionaries were not involved in its
implementation. Anganwadi workers went house to
house and filled the forms of the identified beneficiaries
and sent it for registration in the scheme. Even the listed
beneficiaries who were interviewed did not know the
details of the benefits or conditionalities involved, except
that they would come in for some easy money when the
girl becomes 18 years old.
“We don’t know when we get benefits we will see.
(After prompts about what they were told when the
forms were filled) Yes we will get money after
18 years.” – Registered beneficiary
The other theme that emerged was a clash between
the culture of giving subsidies being promoted by the
political class but with the need for accountability by bu-
reaucrats. It appeared that the community’s commitment
was to generally get as much subsidy as they could from
the government without in any way linking this to any
change.
“No one says ‘no’ to money, all types of people come
forward, if they have a daughter they would come for
the scheme. When we go to houses……………… we tell
them that you will get these benefits then they are
more than willing and then we tell them get these
papers ready – birth certificates of both girls,domiciles, ration cards and schedule caste certificate”–
Community Level implementer
Too many conditionalities and documentary require-
ments to access the benefit and delays in getting regis-
tered for the schemes also highlighted the problems with
the program. The fact that even five to six years after
sending the papers, the beneficiaries had not got their
saving certificates testifies to a lack of seriousness in the
implementation. Also the first year ABAD’s beneficiaries
who had their payout scheduled in 2012 (after 18 years);
had not received their payments so far.
In the ratio of 40:60 there would be 60 who do not
have the necessary documents, only 40% would be
having the relevant documents.– Community Level
Implementer
They also voiced their suggestions that giving the
amount at the time of marriage needs to be reviewed.
They suggested that the funds can be given earlier so
that these are used for girls’ education.
Discussion
Girl child discrimination as well as use of CCTs as a tool
to promote equity by governments have received suffi-
cient attention among academics and policy makers in
the recent past. There has been a growing interest in
CCTs as a result of their well documented impacts on
poverty and inequality as well as on education and
health indicators of beneficiaries. Evaluations of CCT in
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grams to be effective in raising households’ investment
in children [4,6,7]. Most CCT schemes use a well defined
and short-term condition (immunization, schooling) for
receiving benefits. The schemes evaluated in this paper
are different from other CCT programs in both the type
of conditionality (daughter’s birth, education and mar-
riage delay) and the long 18-year period over which
transfers are made. This also means that a full-impact
analysis is not possible currently. Some evaluations have
been carried out in the recent past in India of such CCT
schemes on girl children [22-27] which have given vari-
able results. Overall our study indicates that while there
has been some improvement in the indicators used to
measure investment in girl children, these were probably
long term trends and were seen among boys as well
indicating no specific impact of this scheme in raising
the girl children’s status in this community. Our study
also raises questions about the program design and
implementation.
Haryana pioneered this kind of scheme which has
since been replicated in most states of India, and there
appears to be a political recognition of the problem. The
change from ABAD to Laadli was driven by political rea-
sons as the party in power changed in 2005 and wanted
to derive political mileage out of this scheme by launch-
ing a new scheme but in reality, tweaking an old one.
This means that parties consider such gender related
schemes as having a political value, which augurs well
for sustainability of such programs in general. These
schemes also fit in with the current scenario in India
where political parties are vying with each other to dole
out subsidies and incentives to win votes. These schemes
may not reflect a true commitment of the political class
to addressing this issue effectively as this will necessarily
pit them against entrenched interests in the community.
The subsidy may be seen as an end rather than as a
means to an end.
In its first avatar as ABAD, the scheme focused on dis-
advantaged families and included all girls. This contrasts
with the evidence including from Ballabgarh that the
practice of sex determination was more among educated
and wealthy people [13]. When the scheme was revised,
it did away with targeting the disadvantaged but was
made applicable only for second girl child. While this
change is supported by data, the fact that we focus only
on the second child means that the scheme is not look-
ing at changing community’s mindset which needs an
universal approach. While many states have kept adop-
tion of a permanent method of contraception as one of
the conditionalities, in Haryana subsequent girl children
(beyond the second) are not eligible which adds one
more dimension to the issue. Conceptually one could
also question the need of a program centered aroundfinancial incentive on a social problem which is more
common among rich and educated and the quantum of
benefit being too little for these groups. The maturity
amount of US$ 500 would be insufficient for marriage of
a girl child even among the poor segments of the popu-
lation and would be considered too small by the richer
segments to effect any behavior change. The cost of
marriage in rural Haryana would vary between US$
10,000 to over US$ 200,000. In addition the cost of rais-
ing a child is quite variable and difficult to estimate in
rural India, as the investments even for boys are only
modest. In the middle income economic group in urban
areas, it would be around US$ 100,000 up to 18 years of
age. Sekher estimated that the maturity amount was
around 3.9% of the investment for child care [15]. People
have also questioned the wisdom of bribing parents to
keep their daughters thereby reinforcing stereotypes that
they are liabilities. Others have also voiced concerns that
providing gifts in kind to the girl at the time of her mar-
riage may send out a wrong message to the community
as an implicit involvement of the state in covering mar-
riage related financial transactions. Incidentally there is
also a government scheme called “Kanyadan” in which
disadvantaged people are paid US$ 600 at the time of
marriage of their daughters.
Poor involvement of the health department, local gov-
ernments (Panchayats), NGOs, and women’s groups has
also been reported by others. Lack of community aware-
ness and participation of panchayats was also reported
by Paruthi et al. in a survey among 60 Panchayat mem-
bers in neighbouring district of Gurgaon of whom only
53% were aware of ABAD [28]. A greater degree of en-
gagement of these stakeholders would result in better
monitoring of implementation and also most import-
antly, place the scheme in a broader context of village or
community development.
Our study, as well as previous evaluations of such
schemes in other states of India, have highlighted the
problems of ambiguous and complicated application
processes, and delays in receipt of benefits [16,26]. A
common complaint from the beneficiaries across the
states has been the difficulty in obtaining various docu-
ments required to apply and receive benefits under the
schemes, especially the domicile certificates. This calls
for simplification of the schemes.
Though year after year substantial financial resources
have been directed towards promoting these schemes,
there is a lack of field level monitoring. Though random
verification is to be carried out by the district level offi-
cials to examine the authenticity and eligibility of appli-
cants, lack of field staff means that this was never done.
We used our community database to estimate the num-
ber of beneficiaries and found out that 13% of births in
Ballabgarh villages would qualify as Laadli beneficiaries.
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it is difficult to make an estimate of coverage, but the
numbers given indicate moderate coverage.
Both community members and implementers reported
that the problem of girl child discrimination was de-
creasing though this was not supported by data. On the
whole, both the government officials and the beneficiar-
ies did recognize some positive aspects of the incentive
driven Schemes. A general support for such schemes
was noted and has been commented upon by others
[15]. The general perceptions of these schemes have
been that they are for marriage for children of poor fam-
ilies. As we found, another study reported that only
some believed that this was aimed at correcting the sex
ratio at birth and very few believed that this was for
better education and employability of the girl so as to
improve her social status [22].
There are two studies which require closer scrutiny as
these have also looked at impact of this scheme in Hary-
ana using secondary data. A World Bank evaluation of
ABAD scheme using National Family Health Survey
(NFHS) data showed that it had a positive effect on the
sex ratio of living children, but inconclusive effects on
mothers’ preferences for having female children as well
as total desired fertility. They also reported that parents
made greater post-natal health investments in eligible
girls, though the early cohort of eligible school-age girls
were not significantly more likely to attend school. How-
ever, conditional on attending any school, they were
more likely to continue their education. The survival of
girl children improved during the period 1993–2006 at a
much higher rate as compared to boys and among girls,
the improvement in ABAD eligibles (disadvantaged) was
more than that of non-eligibles indicating a positive pro-
gram impact on survival [29].
Mazumdar evaluated Laadli Scheme using two rounds
of District Level Household Survey- 2002–04 (baseline)
and 2007–08 (post-intervention) [30]. They used data
from Punjab (a neighbouring state which also has gender
based discrimination) as a control. A difference-in-
difference analysis showed that the increase in percent-
age of women who had at least one daughter between
2004 to 2008 was not significantly more in Haryana
(0.42%). When this analysis was restricted to neighbor-
ing districts as being socio-culturally similar (Faridabad
got excluded), then the likelihood of having at least one
daughter increased significantly by 2.3% between 2004
and 2008 in Haryana as compared to Punjab. The differ-
ence was much lower if the sample was restricted to
women who already had a girl child (intended benefi-
ciary of Laadli), even in the restricted analysis of neigh-
boring districts. The authors concluded that the
improved sex ratio may not be attributable to Laadli
Scheme and also raise the possibility that the schememay not have been uniformly effective in all parts of the
state.
The differences in the results of these two studies and
our study need careful scrutiny. While both the above
mentioned studies included the whole of Haryana and
used secondary data that was periodically collected, we
restricted our analysis to one block in a district of
Haryana but used a better quality longitudinal dataset
where all births and deaths have been counted for many
decades. The possibility of differential implementation
and effectiveness of schemes has already been commen-
ted upon. There was only pre-and-post control in the
study by the World Bank whereas the other two studies
had concurrent controls. Our study used daughters-in-
law from outside Haryana as controls while Mazumdar
et al. used girls from a neighboring state. We used data
up to 2010 which meant a longer time for programs to
show impact as compared to others. Increase in girl
child registration is a positive fallout of these interven-
tions, and this could result in a spurious increase in re-
ported sex ratio at birth and therefore, using this
indicator to measure success of the program needs cau-
tion. Earlier rounds of NFHS have been criticized for
underreporting of births especially of girls [31]. Our
study along with the above two studies also highlights
the challenges in evaluating such schemes. The chal-
lenges include lack of a control group, existing secular
trend of development in the community with rapid
changes in social structures and environment in last dec-
ade, absence of database that includes beneficiary status.
Due to these, even if the analysis show a positive impact,
it is very difficult to attribute changes to such schemes.
The strengths of this study include a comprehensive
approach to the evaluation of girl child schemes through
the use of multiple sources of information using a mixed
methods approach and the use of longitudinal secondary
data to measure its impact with both historic and
current controls. The results from the three data sources
as well as from different respondents reinforced each
other. This triangulation adds confidence to our inter-
pretation. The weaknesses include non availability of the
data by beneficiary status and small number of inter-
views and the fact that the interviews were conducted by
a medical doctor from a nearby hospital could have pre-
judiced the respondents during the indepth interviews.
Also a more sophisticated statistical analysis adjusting
for different confounders would have made the temporal
trend assessment more robust. Our study area is differ-
ent from rest of Haryana in terms of having a high
coverage with antenatal care and vaccination and there-
fore, the improvement in overall coverage might have
obliterated any sex differential. This indicates that strat-
egies that improve the implementation of program to at-
tain universal coverage may do better to address gender
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that our study results are trustworthy and credible.
Overall, our study and other studies report a nil or
modest degree of success of implementation of schemes
which use CCTs to address larger social behaviors. One
of the reasons for this could be that success of CCT pro-
grams require that these are set within a larger social
protection system to ensure their financial sustainability;
and to assure long-term institutional development. This
is also reflected in a Government report on Gender and
the Sex Ratio, which says “This situation poses a formid-
able challenge to public policy. It is not a phenomenon
restricted to the very poor, which governments can at-
tempt to solve through cash transfers or through the
banning of medical diagnostic technologies alone.
Clearly something is wrong, and successive governments
have been unable to put their finger on the pulse of the
problem. While it is difficult to tackle a problem that
essentially stems from social and cultural attitudes as
well as prejudices through State-led intervention alone,
equally no nation can afford to not intervene when nat-
ural demography is tampered with in a manner that is
unprecedented” [17].
Based on this study we make following recommendations:
1. Such schemes should not be seen as mere CCT
schemes or subsidies but have to be a component of
a multi-sectoral drive involving all stakeholders.
2. The schemes need to be revised if we want
communities to change, to include universal
eligibility, substantial increase in incentives and
restructuring in such a way that it is useful for girl’s
education and not only as a fund for marriage or
dowry and finally to reduce the bureaucracy
involved in its implementation.
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